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Security

Summary

Stroma operates at a sensitive boundary: it processes private keys, signed events, encrypted payloads, and untrusted relay input. Security properties are made explicit and tested rather than inferred from successful transport.

Current safeguards

  • operating-system randomness for keys, nonces, and signatures;
  • canonical event hashing and independent BIP-340 verification;
  • authenticated NIP-44 decryption before plaintext decoding;
  • constant-time MAC comparison;
  • configurable plaintext and payload-size ceilings;
  • recipient and signature checks during gift-wrap unwrapping;
  • bounded relay timeouts and operation-scoped connections;
  • official protocol vectors and malformed-input tests.

Trust boundary

Stroma verifies protocol mechanics. It cannot determine whether an event's author should be trusted, whether a relay is complete, or whether application content is true. Those judgments belong to Acorn and the applications using it.

Current limitations

The optional post-quantum design proposes ML-DSA and ML-KEM payload protection without changing standard Nostr events. An experimental primitive backend is available, but the envelope is not implemented. Existing encryption gains no automatic PQ protection. Key recovery and identity trust remain explicit application responsibilities.

Stroma is unaudited pre-release software. Its current relay interface is deliberately small and has not yet completed Acorn's live relay-suitability suite. NIP-44 protects message confidentiality and integrity under its stated cryptographic assumptions; Stroma does not claim to make secp256k1 key exchange post-quantum resistant.

Read the full security policy