Spurline Operational Witness Policy Version 1
Spurline-Clock-Profile: operational-v1
Authority and scope
The policy owner is the operator identified by the relay's verified commissioning attestation and witness authorization. Adopting this policy requires that operator's signature over a request containing the digest of these exact UTF-8 bytes. The grant identifies the service public key, permitted subject kinds, and validity period. This policy grants no authority by itself.
The service may witness complete Nostr kind 1415 and 1416 events within its authorized scope. It independently verifies each event ID and signature and commits to both the event ID and exact signature. Its receipt means that the service observed that signed assertion, not that the assertion is true or consequentially valid under OpenETR or any other ruleset.
Operational time and unspecified accuracy
Receipts use the relay's NTP-synchronized system clock. The service makes no numeric guarantee of accuracy relative to UTC, no sub-second accuracy promise, and no claim of authoritative ordering across relays. Millisecond field encoding is a representation choice, not a precision claim. Receipts do not establish the original creation time of the subject or a strict externally verified UTC deadline, even when a signature is authentic.
Receipts follow experimental observation-receipt schema version 2, kind 1418,
with clock_uncertainty_ms: null, clock_accuracy: "unspecified" and
clock_basis: "ntp-synchronized-system-clock". Null does not mean zero. A relying
party requiring bounded accuracy must reject this time assurance as insufficient.
The deployment uses a trusted host monitor of systemd-timesyncd. Witnessing requires active timesyncd, a positive synchronization status, and a recorded successful synchronization no more than two hours old. The monitor refreshes status approximately every ten seconds; the relay accepts checks no more than 30 seconds old. These are liveness thresholds, not accuracy bounds. A fresh monitor check does not assert that a new NTP exchange occurred.
The relay stops acquiring or signing receipts when these checks fail or become stale. Detection is not instantaneous; it is limited by the monitor cadence, status reporting, and the two-hour last-sync threshold. Missing monitor data is not interpreted as healthy. A detected wall-clock/monotonic-clock divergence greater than 250 milliseconds during the relay process lifetime blocks signing until an operator checks the clock and restarts the process. This threshold is a discontinuity alarm, not a bound on absolute accuracy. Clock manipulation, gradual drift, changes during downtime, dishonest monitoring, and malicious NTP responses are not ruled out by these checks.
Authorization and processing
Acquisition and issuance require current authorization and no local suspension. The relay evaluates grant windows against its local clock; without a numeric uncertainty bound it cannot guarantee that those decisions satisfy strict UTC boundaries. Renewal or revocation does not rewrite earlier evidence. Suspension and signed authorization changes are serialized with issuance locally.
The service retains the original observation time across retries and issues within 60 seconds according to its local clock. It does not backdate receipts or refresh a pending job's time to make it eligible. Queue saturation or failed checks may prevent a receipt even when the underlying event is accepted. There is no guarantee that every eligible event receives a receipt. A Nostr acceptance response confirms subject storage, not issuance of a witness receipt.
Publication and retention
Receipts are durably stored on the local relay before delivery to subscribers. Clients can retrieve them by subject event reference. Retries reuse the exact committed receipt. External replication and historical backfill are not promised. The operator publishes commissioning and authorization evidence and makes this policy available for independent verification.
No permanent or global retention guarantee is made. Normal relay deletion rules, operator removal, outages, and data loss may affect availability. Operators may remove material for legal, privacy, security, or operational reasons. Relying parties should retain portable copies of the subject, receipt, policy, and authority evidence. Failure to retrieve evidence does not prove it never existed.
Operator responsibilities and reliance
The operator protects the service key, commissioning key, monitor, and retained evidence; keeps backups and recovery arrangements; and suspends witnessing when compromise or unreliable time is suspected. The operator reviews incidents and communicates affected identities, receipts and relevant revocation evidence to known relying parties through its established operational channels. This policy does not promise a notification deadline or universal discovery of every holder.
Relying parties verify signatures, exact subject binding, policy digest, and the known commissioning and witness-authorization lifecycle. They independently decide whether to recognize the operator. Neither this policy nor a receipt certifies content, legal status, complete history, or the absence of conflicting evidence. Operational time is supporting evidence, not a substitute for explicit OpenETR validation rules.