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Spurline System Clock Witness Policy Version 1

Spurline-Clock-Profile: system-v1

Authority and observation

The policy owner is the operator identified by the relay's verified commissioning and witness authorization. This policy takes effect only when that operator signs a grant containing the digest of these exact policy bytes. The grant names the service key, allowed kinds and validity interval.

The relay may observe complete signed Nostr kind 1415 and 1416 events. It verifies the event ID and signature and binds its receipt to both. A receipt means the relay reports observing that signed assertion; it does not certify its content, legal status, or consequential validity under OpenETR.

System time only

Observation and issuance timestamps come from the relay's system clock through Python's time.time(). No external clock monitor or synchronization check is required. Host NTP may run independently, but this policy makes no claim that NTP is enabled, synchronized, or accurate.

Version 3 receipts use clock_basis: "system-clock", clock_accuracy: "unspecified", and clock_uncertainty_ms: null. Null does not mean zero error. Millisecond encoding does not promise millisecond accuracy. A signature authenticates the relay's statement, not its clock. The receipt cannot alone establish a strict UTC deadline, exact original creation time, or authoritative ordering across relays.

The relay checks for wall-clock versus monotonic-clock discontinuities greater than 250 milliseconds during its process lifetime. Detection blocks acquisition and issuance until the clock is investigated and the relay restarted. This alarm is not an accuracy bound and does not detect every clock problem, gradual drift, manipulation, or changes during downtime. An inaccurate but steadily advancing clock may still produce receipts. The operator remains responsible for host time and for suspending witnessing when it is unreliable.

Processing and authority

Current witness authorization and absence of local suspension are required at acquisition and issuance. Grant windows and the maximum 60-second issuance delay are checked against local time, without a guaranteed UTC error interval. Authorization changes and suspension serialize with local receipt issuance. Pending jobs retain their original observation time; changing policies or clock modes does not silently rewrite them. No backdating or historical backfill is promised. Queue limits and failed checks can prevent a receipt even when the underlying event is accepted. Ordinary event acceptance is not a receipt promise.

Publication, retention and reliance

Receipts are durably stored locally before delivery to subscribers. Retrying delivery reuses the committed receipt. The operator makes the commissioning chain, witness authorization, and exact policy bytes available for verification. External replication, complete discovery and permanent retention are not guaranteed. Normal deletion rules, administrative removal, outages, and data loss can affect availability. Operators may remove material for legal, privacy, security or operational reasons; absence is not proof of nonexistence.

The operator protects signing keys and retained evidence, maintains backups, and suspends witnessing when compromise is suspected. It communicates incidents and applicable revocation evidence through established operational channels; no universal notification or response-time guarantee is made.

Relying parties independently verify the exact subject binding, signatures, policy digest, known authorization lifecycle, and whether they recognize the commissioning operator. They should retain portable evidence copies. Applications requiring bounded UTC accuracy must treat this time assurance as insufficient. These receipts supplement, and do not replace, OpenETR validation rules.