Security Statement
You have agency over your data—including your funds and records. Choosing a trusted service to help manage them should be your choice, not a surrender of that agency. This principle guides OakGate's design and the responsibilities of anyone operating it.
Help with the complexity. Choice stays with you.
OakGate is designed for people who want familiar sign-in, recoverable access and simple everyday payments and record sharing. You can rely on a provider to look after the technical details while you use Everyday Funds, Community Credits and the records that matter to you.
This is a custodial relationship: OakGate retains the secrets needed to operate your Acorn on your behalf. That enables background payment receipt and convenient access without asking you to manage private keys each day. It also means choosing an operator you trust with significant responsibility.
What that trust means
Custody does not make the operator unable to access your wallet. OakGate protects stored recovery material with encryption, but the running service can use it. An operator with sufficient access—or someone who compromises that access—could read private information or exercise wallet authority. Encryption at rest does not remove this trust.
A responsible provider must protect your information, explain its use and retention, maintain reliable recovery and backups, and make access and revocation choices understandable. You should know who operates your home instance, how to contact them, and what happens if their service becomes unavailable.
OakGate is in active development. Successful demonstrations and automated tests are not an independent security audit or an enterprise certification. Use small test balances and non-critical records until your deployment has been reviewed for its intended use.
The same Acorn, with a path to independence
OakGate uses the same safebox-acorn foundation as independent clients. Funds and records do not become an OakGate-only format simply because you choose custody. Google is an optional login provider, not your Acorn's cryptographic identity. Community-operated infrastructure and replaceable services remain Mainstay principles.
Available today: you can request your recovery phrase, bootstrap relay and recovery mode after fresh authentication. Keep a secure independent copy before you need it. Disclosure alone does not stop custody or remove the provider's access. Restoring all capabilities also depends on the relevant relay, storage and mint state; a phrase alone is not a guarantee of complete recovery.
Our commitment: you should be able to end the custodial relationship and continue independently. The complete Go Independent workflow remains planned. It must verify independent recovery, handle pending payments safely, stop background activity, revoke delegated access and remove retained custody data without destroying your external Acorn.
Providers must be honest about deletion: backups may have disclosed retention periods, and no service can prove that every historical copy of a secret was erased. Giving you recovery information is not proof that only you now control it. See Go Independent for the intended process and its remaining work.
Everyday tools, clear boundaries
A paired card or POS terminal can make everyday interactions easier, but its permissions matter. Inexpensive NFC cards can be copied. A PIN protects only the flows that check it; some current payment and record-presentation flows rely on the card credential without a PIN. Review the card trust model and revoke a lost or compromised card promptly.
Presenting a record shares information with its recipient. Closing the display cannot erase a copy they made. An OpenETR anchor identifies signed evidence and a publisher's statement; it does not independently establish that the statement is true or that the publisher is a recognized authority.
Read the full policy
This brief explains the user-facing choices. The repository's Security and Custodial Trust policy (SECURITY.md) sets out vulnerability reporting, technical boundaries, residual risks and operator responsibilities in more detail.
For current capabilities and remaining acceptance checks, see Project status. For how these choices fit the wider architecture, see Mainstay principles.
Connected homes, distinct responsibilities
A participating OakGate home can accept signed POS requests from another home, or contact a foreign card's issuer. The issuer retains the wallet's private keys and checks card validity and its acceptance policy. The merchant's home receives the operation result, including any explicitly requested balances or records. These homes do not share an account session or custody database.
Current card-based POS payments and disclosure do not require a PIN. A copied card may therefore be usable through an accepted home. Signatures verify the service, not the physical tag or independent holder consent. Revocation and the issuer's optional allowlist remain important choices. See the cross-home trust model.
Comparing card capabilities
See the card capabilities policy brief for a comparison with credit cards, debit cards and government IDs, including the distinction between current features, earlier demonstrations and planned integration.